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CONCILIATION AS A FUNCTION OF THE
JUDGE
Our courts are congested, and to such an extent is justice
delayed that it is often denied. This is due to several reasons,
some of which have been subjects for frequent discussion. Notice
pleading, declaratory judgments, rules of courts, small claims
courts, unified courts, and other matters of evidence and plead-
ing are reforms accomplished or proposed.' All these are of
vital importance, but generally they deal with means of expe-
diting litigation or securing a greater measure of justice therein.
There is a coordinate subject of equal worth. It deals not with
better conduct of trials, but the avoidance of trials. This sub-
ject has received some attention but not that study its import-
ance warrants.
In general, settlement of disputes may be aided in two
ways; either in the regularly constituted courts, or separate tri-
bunals created for that purpose. These conciliation tribunals
have been established in Topeka, Leavenworth, Kansas City,
Mlinneapolis and New York City. North Dakota and Iowa have
passed statutes of state wide application.2  All these deal
usually with small claims and so far as the conciliation feature
is concerned, have not been notably successful, but this failure
is due probably to the fact that conciliation has been entrusted
to special tribunals "limited to this one method,' -to those
inferior courts in which the people rightly or wrongly repose lit-
tle confidence as compared with the regularly constituted and
familiar courts of justice. 3
By conciliation then, is meant the reconciliation of parties
to litigation and settlement of their disputes, as distinguished
from industrial conciliation thru arbiters and boards for that
purpose. Likewise, conciliation as a method of settling private
controversy, otherwise adjudicated by litigation, should be con-
'See a summary in 7 Cornell Law Quarterly 310. See "Some
Principles of Procedural Reform" in 4 Ill. Law Rev. 388, by Roscoe
Pound.2 See Reginald Heber Smith's Article in Legal Aid Review, Apr.
1924. Cit. at note 2.
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stantly distinguished from conciliation tribunals and small
claims courts.4
The beneficial results to flow from the general adoption of
a serious attempt at conciliation, are apparent, and are discussed
in the reference.5 The opinion of those who have given thought
to the matter, is expressed in the following sentence by Judge
Parry: "In all legal reforms, I place in the forefront, concilia-
tion." 6
It has been pointed out that the practical way to forward
the cause of conciliation is to entrust it to the established courts
and to encourage its greater realization.7 Believing this to be
the correct path to follow, it is worthwhile to fix the fact that
the courts do have the power to suggest and supervise concilia-
tion, lest, as in the case of the rule making power, the lack of
exercise of the power generally serve as an excuse for going to
the legislature for an authority already possessed by the courts.
It is a matter of common knowledge that judges in England
and the United States employ their good offices, upon some
occasions in effecting settlements.8 Necessarily, these instances
are seldom of record,'but every lawyer knows the fact from his
own experience. It seems then not unreasonable to suppose that
it is an inherent'power of the court to encourage, suggest, and
if necessary, sufervise conciliation.9.
This conclusion is in agreement with the meager authority
to be found in the present day decisions. Indeed, a note in 2
A. L. R. 1068, says that there appears to be only one case which
passes directly upon the question. The reference is to Harring-
ton v. Boston Elevated Railway " in which it appeared that the
presiding judge, during the trial below, suggested compromise
to the defendant's counsel; even naming the amount defendant
should be willing to pay. It was urged on appeal that this
showed partiality and violated "the right of every citizen to
be tried by judges as free, impartial and independent as the lot
4 22 Legal Aid Review, 21 Apr. 1924.
'Note 1, supra.
'Law and the Poor, (p. 187) by E. A. Parry.TCitation at note 2.
'See the London Times, Nov. 16, 1927, p. 5. for a case where the
settlement of an important libel case was due to the efforts of the
presiding judge.
' "Boni judicis est lites dirimere." It is a function of a good judge
to adjust disputes. 4 Coke 15b; 5 Coke 31a.
1' 229 Mass. 421.
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of humanity will admit," as provided by Art. 29 of Declaration
of Rights. In response to the foregoing, Rugg, C. J., said "The
conduct of the presiding judge did not violate the justly strict
and lofty standard of our Constitution. It is not necessarily a
transgression of judicial propriety to suggest to parties in
appropriate instances the wisdom of a compromise of conflicting
contentions. It is a suggestion which always should be ventured
from the bench with caution." In the opinion, the court refers
to In re Nevitt,11 in which a Federal judge had for several years
tried to "persuade the parties to the controversy to compromise
the litigation." Later, he rendered a decision in the cause, and
his conduct was urged as a disqualification, in answer to which
the Federal Court said that the judge's "earnest and systematic
endeavor to effect a compromise of this controversy bespeaks for
him emphatic commendation." Commenting upon this in the
Harrington -case, supra, the court said "this laudation goes
rather far. But it shows that an intimation as to the practical
sagacity of harmonizing adjustable differences is not of itself
an impairment of the judicial function."
There should be added to the above cases that of Atherton
v. Atherton.12 There, the trial judge, during the progress of a
divorce action, urged the parties in presence of their counsel, to
settle their differences. On appeal, in answer to complaint of
this conduct, the court said "We find nothing in the case which
aids the contention of the appellant that the learned trial judge
committed any indiscretion or violated any rule of law."
Of course, it is not to be contended that one in a judicial
position should so far forsake his position as to become an active
agent for settlement as in Liver-more v. Bainbridge, 3 where a
referee went to the office of counsel for one of the parties and
there had conversation as to counsel's client paying a certain
sum in settlement, the referee suggesting that otherwise, if it
were necessary to render judgment against the client, it might
be for a large amount. The court held such negotiation
improper but suggested "It may be commendable in referee or
court, in presence of both parties, to recommend and urge a
settlement between themselves of their litigation."
Looking at the legal history of the subject, there is seen a
254 C. C. A. 622.
"82 Hun 179, 189.
3Abbott's Practice Reports N. S. 227, 231.
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marked illustration of the court's control over amicable adjust-
ment of litigation, in the old common-law fine. Blackstone 14
says "a fine may be described to be an amicable composition or
agreement of a suit, either actual or fictitious by leave of the
King or his justices, whereby the lands in question become, or
are acknowledged to be the right of the parties." After the
action was brought, there was the licentia concordandi (leave of
court to compose the suit), and following this, the agreement
itself, all being under close supervision of the court.15
Nor was this action resulting in a fine, or "acknowledge-
ment of feoffment on record" (as Blackstone terms it), solitary
as illustrating concord or settlement upon permission of and
under the eye of the court: it was rather a development along
one line of a general situation which may be seen in Glanville
in the following excerpt,
"It happens indeed many times that suits raised in the
court of the King are terminated by an amicable composition
and a final concord, with the consent however, and licence of
the lord the King or of his justices, whatever may be the sub-
ject of the plea, whether concerning land or any other thing." 16
Holdsworth shows that17 "In some of the earlier prece-
dents, it is difficult to distinguish a fine in the strict sense and
a composition dealing with many matters settled by the leave and
with the sanction of the court;" and also that "In the case of
both land and chattels, difficult cases could be settled, and com-
plicated dealings were rendered possible, by a finalis concorda,
or fine, in the royal courts." 18
"Compromising a suit without leave of the court is an
offense to be punishable by amercements." 19
Thruout the Middle Ages, the justices exercise a certain
supervision over the fines that are levied before them.2 0
A writer in the English Historical Review expressed the
opinion that 21 "There is no evidence that any fines prior to the
reign of John were anything more than the composition of
2 Bk. II, 349.
"Note 14, supra, et seq.1* Glanville, Book Eight ch. 1.
Vol. III, p. 237.
1
,Tb. II. pp. 265-6 citing Bracton's Note Book, Cases 520, 546, 1834,
1867.
"Pollock & Maitland, II p. 98.
II Pollock & Maitland 99; III Holdsworth, 252-253.
=25 E. H. R. 709.
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genuine suits; it was only after they had become common that
the idea of using them as a means of securing permanent legal
evidence of the transference of property gradually grew up."
Even back in Anglo Saxon times there is evidence of these
compromises. Holdsworth writes "Perhaps in the accounts of
compromised or decided lawsuits, we can see the germ of what
will become, when the courts begin to keep records, the fine and
recovery of later law." 22
Cruise has it that 23 "a fine was but a covenant of record
from whence it may be contended that the fines were at first
exactly similar to the agreements which in the time of the Anglo
Saxons were entered into at the county courts. But a fine is
distinguished from those agreements by two very material cir-
cumstances; first, nothing appears to have been paid for per-
mission to enter into such a contract and secondly, it was not
enrolled among the records of the court."
Henry Adams in Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law writes, p. 26,
"'A very slight examination of the law cases will show how
rarely the parties were allowed to push their differences to a
final judgment. A compromise was always effected where com-
promise was possible."
Permission of the magistrate seems likewise to have been
necessary in the local courts. 'In the 15th century, an old record
reads, z4 "Also it is used before the law don on the ple declared
by the consent of the parties here they may accord, and also yf
they wyll co(n)tenew by lycence of the bailif and the court, and
then shall one of hem sey in thys maner 'Syres, leve for to
aeorde; after they shall goo owt and make acorde betwene hem,
and peraventure one of hem shall wage amends; after that the
parties shall come in, ande one of hem shall sey thus 'Syrs T.
de F. and W. de R. shall yeve to T. de F. ii s. or more or lesse, for
to have hys love, and he shall foryeve all manner dontractes
betwene them than for to pay ii s at swych a day; and W. de R.
shall withdra7e the court."
And "It is our wont in every plea to give a love-day at the
prayer of the parties."25
"II Holdsworth 78, citing Essays in Anglo Saxon Law, App. nos. 2,
3, 6, 7, 10, 30. See also Bigelow's Placita Anglo-Normannica p. 265.
'uCruise, Fines p. 15. (3rd Ed.)
24 Selden Society, Borough Customs, Vol. 18, pp. 89-90, quoting Lydd
cap. 49, and Romney, c. 38.
" Did p. 90, quoting Fordwich cap. 76.
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In discussing the origin of trespass, Professor George E.
Woodbine says 26 "Though the idea of an action for the recovery
of damages was seemingly foreign to the legal consciousness of
the Anglo Saxon race, another idea took its place, and through
a different procedure, produced the same general result. This
was the compromise, one of the most fundamental ideas in Anglo
Saxon law and procedure as we know it." And it is his opinion
that the method of compromise was the "habitual way of settling
disputes well into the 13th century," both in civil and criminal
actions. In an illustrative case quoted in the article above, the
compromise began "By the King's license it is covenanted etc.,"
and concluded "And Thomas gives the King forty marks for
the license to compromise." 27
It is the opinion of the above named writer, that this case,
among others, shows that it was taken for granted that the par-
ties would need counsel of the judges in arriving at an agree-
ment and that it was their duty to see that agreements were not
made without their consent, and that the royal revenue was
increased by the money payment made for the permission to
agree. 28
The cases set out in Healey's Somersetshire Pleas, Mait-
land's Select Pleas of the Crown, Baildon's Select Civil Pleas
and Bigelow's Placita Anglo Normannica,2 9 together with the
other authorities, supra, make it certain that in Anglo Saxon and
Norman times, not only were there frequent compromises
between the parties, but these compromises were authorized by
and under the control of the judges.
The reason why compromises were so common in these early
times, is no doubt found in the fact that parties wished to avoid
the expense, the uncertainty and delay which came to be the
inevitable consequences of litigation in the crude system which,
prevailed. 0 As time went on, and the system increased in effi-
ciency it was necessary to use compromises in smaller measure.
In our own country, the common law and the judicial
system transplanted in part from England served fairly well the
needs of a pioneer community -with its small amount of litiga-
" 33 Y. L. J. 799, 803.
'
T Selden Society, Maitland's Select Pleas of the Crown No. 102.
"33 Y. E. J. 805-6.
"See note (26).
1See Henry Adams in "Essays on Anglo Saxon Law" p. 53.
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tion. The local court sessions were social and educational events,
and tho, even then, the litigants had done well to compose their
differences and avoid legal strife, the volume of business was
not such that it was necessary to find some means of lessening
it to avoid delay, denial of justice and unbearable expense,
a situation that confronts us today. So, then, as the crude Ipgal
system of our Anglo Saxon forefathers necessitated employment
of conciliation, so now the enormous increase in the amount of
litigation and the change in the character of this legal buinss
impel us to seek some method of decreasing the amount of litiga-
tion and expediting that litigation when carried to its conclu-
sion. Conciliation should prove a worthy complement to pre-
cedural reforms necessary to bring about expedition required
in our complex industrial communities. In this connection,
particularly as bearing upon the rule making power, there is a
significant statement by Dean Pound in an address before the
American Bar Association 31 "Apprentice-trained, rule-of-
thumb-trained lawyers have been unable to think of adminis-
tration of justice without a hypertrophy of procedure. But we
cannot go on in the'urban industrial America of today under
the heavy weight of procedural detail with which our courts are
struggling. If we demand that our courts do things we must
give them power to do things-we must set them free to do
things. We must hold them to the substantive law indeed. But
we must not make the substantive law nugatory by loading the
courts with procedural requirements. We must cease to pre-
scribe the details of procedure by legislation."
Courts once had the rule making power, and it is their own
fault if thru lack of use, they may be considered to have lost it,
and must now look to the legislature. Likewise with the power
of the judges to effect conciliation, they have had such power
and have used it-they still use it on occasion, but there seems
to be no conscious effort of active participation on their part
such as their power and their duty warrant. Let the judges not
wait for the legislature either to set up tribunalss of concilia-
tion-of doubtful efficacy here in the United States;--or to
grant them in general terms the power they already have of
becoming an active force in conciliation. In other words it is
not necessary for the legislature to tell the judges: "Bestir
'Roscoe Pound in 12 A. B. A. Journal p. 603.
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yourselves to bring about settlements wherever possible. At
least be wide awake to occasions when you may suggest amicable
adjustments." They already possess this power, but the duty
rests lightly on some magistrates. We know, as before sug-
gested, that judges do upon occasion use their good offices to
bring causes to an amicable conclusion, but it is urged that it
become a uniform course of action, rather than an occasional
suggestion. Compulsion, of course would be out of the question,
but aid and counsel and sympathetic understanding on the part
of the magistrate would do wonders, for by the virtue of his
office, suggestions from him often would lead to a satisfactory
amicable conclusion, when advice from friends or counsel would
go unheeded.
CONCILIATION IN EUROPE:
In Denmark, conciliation has been for several centuries a
part of the judicial machinery, and in one form or another has
been marvelously successful down to the present time. It is
effective both by commissions for that purpose, and thru media-
tion of the court with emphasis recently on the latter.8 2
A similar situation is found in Norway where again the
recent trend is toward judicial conciliation as distinguished
from that performed by commissions. It was the opinion of
Attorney General Getz of.Norway that conciliation could best
be submitted to judges in the ordinary courts of law.33
In both Norway and Denmark the number of cases disposed
of thru these peaceable efforts is almost incredible and the con-
sequent saving in time and money incalculable. 34
In both of these countries, generally, a conciliation proceed-
ing is a prerequisite before suit can be instituted.
By legislation in Sweden dating from the 17th century it
is incumbent upon the judge, in both upper and lower courts,
where both parties appear, to endeavor to effect a settlement.35
In Germany, under the Code of 1877, a preliminary hearing
for conciliation was not obligatory, except in matrimonial
2 See the whole subject "Denmark Conciliation System" in Monthly
Labor Review of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Dept. of Labor,
May 1926.
'Cit. at note 32, June, 1926.
"Cit. at notes 32 and 33.
" History of Continental Civil Procedure, Continental Legal His-
tory Series p. 847.
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causes, 30 but under the Code of 1924, conciliation was adopted as
a general measure fo' ordinary causes. In the collegial courts,
the only provision is that in the preparatory proceeding, the
president or officiating judge "shall at the outset, attempt to
effect an amicable adjustment of the controversy," while in the
Amtsgericht, a definite mode of procedure is established. In this
court there must be a special conciliatory proceeding before the
commencement of the action proper, except in certain specified
cases and others which the court, in the exercise of its discretion,
may exempt from the requirement. The procedural steps are:
(1) Petition for conciliation; (2) appointment by the court of
a day for hearing in conciliation, notice "of which must be served
upon defendant; (3) hearing by the court at time appointed,
and discussion of the whole matter with the parties in an
endeavor to bring about a settlement; (4) entry of the settle-
ment agreement effective as any other judgment, or the concilia-
tion failing, the trial of the cause (on motion of either party)
as any other contested cause. "If no such motion is made and
the petition is not withdrawn the court grants a certificate evi-
dencing the failure of conciliation, which enables the action to
be brought afresh within one year without renewal of the con-
ciliation proceeding." In the conciliation proceeding if there
is default of appearance by both sides, the petition is treated as
withdrawn, if on the part of one side only, the cause proceeds
as in the ordinary case of default.37
In Austria, too, in some courts there is provision for sum-
mons of defendant for reconciliation.38
In France, the action proper must be preceded, in most
cases, by a conciliation hearing before a judge de Paiv. The
proceeding is begun by citation, unless the parties voluntarily
appear. It is informal and the Justice is merely a mediator
between the parties, tho he may put questions and elicit neces-
sary explanations. At the end of the proceeding the Justice
draws up a minute (proces verbal) recording the terms of the
settlement if the conciliation was successful, and if not, then,
recording the failure of the proceeding. 39
Of the tribunals of Italy, in which civil jurisdiction is
" History of Continental Civil Procedure. Continental Legal
History Series p. 605.
' Ibid. pp. 622-623 citing Code of 1924 Z. P. 0.
ufbid. p. 641, citing Code of 1895 sec. 433.
"Ibid. pp. 754-755.
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vested, one is called Conciliator, who resembles the -French
Justice of the Peace. "The Italian law, unlike the'French, has
no general requiirement of resort to conciliation proceedings as
a precondition of suit. The Conciliator however is charged with
the duty of attempting to effect conciliation of any controversy
admitting of settlement, whenever requested by the party."
The Conciliator also acts as judge in certain small casess.4o
It is the duty of the Praetor (whose jurisdiction is different
from that of the Conciliator) to attempt a conciliation, and
failing, then to try the case.41  This resembles the procedure
before the Concilator who, before assuming to act in a judicial
capacity, hears the parties as a conciliator and attempts to com-
pose their differences. 42
The foregoing brief references to the status of conciliation
in Europe indicate that it has there an important and appar-
ently permanent place in the administration of justice. The
trend is, in general, away from special conciliation tribunals to
regularly established courts which try the cases in usual fashion
if conciliation fails. As might be expected in such Code
Countries, the matter is covered by statute.
CONCLUSION
What then of the proper method in the United States?
First, should there be statutes upon the subject? We think not,
and for the reason, as we have shown, that it is unnecessary, the
power to act already lying with the judges.
On the other hand, if it were thought advisable to establish
special conciliation tribunals or make conciliation a precondition
of suit, legislation would be necessary but we doubt the advisabil-
ity of either and we see therefore no necessity for legislation.43
Our judges already have the power to act whenever they deem it
advisable. Let them do so. Many judges remonstrate that they
do lend their aid whenever occasion offers. We venture to say,
that, with few exceptions, they do little more than maintain a
sympathetic attitude toward parties and their attorneys. They
are passive and receptive. They do not initiate, and they are not
4 0 Tbid. 804-6.
"Ibid. 804-6.
"Ibia. 830.
4cf. Jour. American, Jud. Soc. Feb., 1929; Willoughby, Principles
of Judicial Administration, 40.
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active. This is 'the principal reason that more has not been ac-
complished in conciliation. It is not a matter of power. It is a
matter of mental attitude. Instead of mere casual assent on the
part of the judge, there should be a conscious definite policy to
bring about conciliation. Both counsel and parties would in
most instances welcome the good offices of the judge. Of course,
there should be no compulsion or intermeddling from the bench,
nor need we fear this. Tact and discretion are necessary but no
more so than in many other relations of the court.44
Each judge, for himself, knows best the manner and method
of conciliation. Some have suggested certain days when parti-
cular attention would be paid to it in addition to lending aid
whenever occasion offered. In those courts where the number of
judges is large enough to permit a choice, such work might well
fall more heavily upon those best adapted for it.
These conclusions are borne out by several years experience
in practice, and in the main, by the views contained in many
letters from trial judges in all parts of the United States.
Experience and investigation permit the conservative state-
ment that some judges consistently do all in their power to bring
about conciliation and others do very little, though practically
all are acquiescent and sympathetic if settlement is suggested by
counsel. But on the whole, little is done in comparison with pos-
sible accomplishment.
The widespread use of conciliation in foreign countries for
hundreds of years, and the persistent attempts in one form or
another in the United States show that it is a matter to be taken
care of. The demand will be met either by independent tribu-
nals or by the more extended and consistent employment of the
method of conciliation by the judges of our present courts. The
power is theirs. The opportunity is theirs.
FRA K H. RANAL.
See statement of Justice Edgar J. Lauer in Annals of American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 136, p. 57, Mch. 1928, to
the effect that "163 cases out of 272 were settled and 109 cases were
tried. In addition to these, 212 cases were settled by the attornys
or parties without the aid of the judges."
